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THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS 
EXPLOITATION OF THE INVESTMENT 
TREATY SYSTEM 
FRANK J. GARCIA* 
Abstract: Third-party funding of international investment arbitration is on the 
rise. Through TPF funders will cover the legal fees of investors filing claims un-
der investment treaties in exchange for a portion of the arbitral award. Propo-
nents of third-party funding claim that it provides access to justice for parties that 
normally would not have the funds to arbitrate against state actors. Given that the 
international investment law that governs these claims is unbalanced, and that 
funding only flows towards investor-claimants, and at the expense of states and 
their taxpayers, allowing third-party funding in investment arbitration risks creat-
ing unjustifiable wealth transfers from the citizens of target states for the benefit 
of speculators. Reform is needed to prevent the deleterious effects of third-party 
funding on developing and newly-industrialized states and on the investment law 
regime itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
Third-party litigation funding (“TPF”) is a rapidly expanding industry in 
which speculators invest in a range of legal claims in exchange for a measure 
of control of the case and a contingency in the recovery.1 As recently as twenty 
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 1 See PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBI-
TRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 7 (2012), https://www.
tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPC9-7GY2] (noting the rapid 
increase in third-party funding of arbitration claims). TPF has been active in fields as diverse as tort 
law, antitrust, intellectual property, and commercial law, and in class-action cases across a range of 
civil litigation settings. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Liti-
gation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) (describing TPF and the various legal fields in which 
it is used). 
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years ago, TPF was illegal throughout the common law as a violation of the 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty, and virtually unknown in the civil 
law world.2 Court decisions in the United Kingdom and Australia, however, 
have initiated a slow but accelerating process of legalization that has spread to 
Europe, the United States, and Asia, raising significant policy concerns.3 Pro-
ponents of TPF argue that it provides a number of benefits across a range of 
dispute settlement platforms, including promoting access to justice and filter-
ing out unmeritorious cases.4 Critics argue, on the other hand, that TPF distorts 
the balance and incentives of traditional dispute resolution towards speculative 
gain in the place of justice and the orderly settlement of disputes.5 
This Essay focuses exclusively on the role of TPF in disputes arising under 
international investment treaties. The contemporary international law regime for 
protecting foreign investment consists of a large number of bilateral investment 
treaties (“BITs”) and related investment chapters of free trade agreements 
(“FTAs” or “incorporated BITs”), coupled with a controversial arbitration-based 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1286–91 (discussing the history of maintenance). Maintenance is 
defined as “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone 
who has no bona fide interest in the case . . . .” Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). Champerty is defined as “[a]n agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a 
litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part 
of any judgment proceeds . . . .” Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); accord 
Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1286–87 (defining champerty and noting that it is a form of maintenance); 
see also Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897) (discussing the policy reasons behind prohibiting 
champerty, including the concern that it would “stir up baseless litigation”); Ari Dobner, Comment, 
Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (1996) (discussing policy reasons behind the pro-
hibition of champerty including maintaining an incentive for settlement, prohibiting corporations from 
the practice of law, preventing the use of lawsuits to harass, and prohibiting a market in the sale of 
lawsuits). 
 3 See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 336 (Austl.); 
Mobil Oil Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Trendlen Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 ALR 51 (Austl.); Arkin v. Borchard Lines 
Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ.) 655 (Eng.); see also JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, STOPPING THE 
SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 1–2 
(2012), https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ATU6-Z53Y] (discussing policy concerns created by an expansion of TPF); Lisa A. Rickard & Mark 
Behrens, Third-Party Litigation Funding in U.S. Enters Mainstream, Leading to Calls for Reform, FI-
NANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2016), https://www.financierworldwide.com/third-party-litigation-funding-
in-us-enters-mainstream-leading-to-calls-for-reform/#.Wz4CNthKjBI [https://perma.cc/H6Q4-FATS] 
(summarizing the negative reaction to TPF by the American legal community). 
 4 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK 
FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 6, 18–20 (2018) [hereinafter IC-
CA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE], https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/
10/40280243154551/icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YNF-7AL6]; 
Steinitz, supra note 1, at 1271–72 (noting the potential for TPF to help provide relief to parties who 
traditionally do not have the resources to access courts); Eric De Brabandere & Julia Lepeltak, Third 
Party Funding in International Investment Arbitration 7 (Grotius Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper 
No. 2012/1, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2078358 (noting some of the benefits of TPF lawsuits). 
 5 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 58–60; BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
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investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (“ISDS”).6 If an investor considers 
that an investment rule in a BIT or FTA has been violated, ISDS provides a 
mechanism through which relief can be sought directly against the host state, 
with TPF funding now increasingly available for the claimant. 
The BIT/ISDS system, however, is widely criticized today on fairness, 
governance, asymmetry, legitimacy, and rule of law grounds, among others.7 
This context is essential for properly evaluating the role of TPF in investment. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the demand by speculators for new invest-
ment vehicles rose, and TPF funders discovered that the political economy of the 
BIT/ISDS system offered the possibility of very high returns with comparatively 
little risk.8 The structural deficits of the BIT/ISDS regime are not irrelevant to 
the TPF phenomenon, but in fact help drive the TPF funding model and make 
investment arbitration a very attractive investment market.9 
                                                                                                                           
 6 A BIT is an “international agreement[] establishing the terms and conditions for private invest-
ment by nationals and companies of one state in another state.” Bilateral Investment Treaty, LEGAL 
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/bilateral_investment_treaty [https://perma.cc/TQ5H-
AZ3S]. An FTA is “[a]n agreement . . . between two or more countries concerning the buying and 
selling of each country’s goods.” Trade Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
ISDS is a mechanism, authorized by a treaty (either a BIT or FTA) or an investment agreement, 
through which disputes arising under that treaty or agreement may be settled through binding arbitra-
tion against the host state. Fact Sheet: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/
2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https://perma.cc/EF8H-97WM]. 
 7 See, e.g., JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATIONS 
WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147–48 (2018) (discussing the unjust nature of interna-
tional investment law); Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement, and Inequality: How International Investment Treaties Exacerbate Domestic Disparities, in 
INTERNATIONAL RULES AND INEQUALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
(José Antonio Ocampo ed., forthcoming 2018) (discussing how international investment law helps 
rich countries at the expense of poor countries); Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International In-
vestment Law as Development Law: The Obsolescence of a Fraudulent System, in EUROPEAN YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 209, 211–12 (M. Bungenberg et al. eds., 2016) (discuss-
ing the negative effect of international investment law on developing countries ); Frank J. Garcia et 
al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 861, 869–73 (2015); Steven Ratner, International Investment Law Through the Lens 
of Global Justice, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 747, 751–52 (2017) (summarizing criticisms for current inter-
national investment law); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Influences Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 58–63 (2013) (discussing exploitative relationships 
that are created under international investment law); Gus Van Harten et al., Investment Provisions in 
Trade and Investment Treaties: The Need for Reform, BOS. UNIV.-GLOBAL ECON. GOVERNANCE INITI-
ATIVE POL’Y BRIEF, Sept. 2015, at 1, https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/12/Investor-State-
Disputes-Policy-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B3Q-8HHD] (discussing the exploitation that exists un-
der current international investment law). 
 8 See Rebecca Lowe, Investment Arbitration Claims Could Be ‘Traded Like Derivatives,’ INT’L 
BAR ASS’N (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=02decc8d-
bf67-4b86-a023-f2ef2aa4843b [https://perma.cc/3CXW-ZJ32] (discussing the use of TPF as an in-
vestment opportunity). 
 9 RSM Prod. Corp. v. St. Lucia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request 
for Security for Costs, ¶ 13 (Aug. 13, 2014) (Griffith, Q.C., Assenting Opinion). One arbitrator went 
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From a public policy perspective, however, these structural deficits, to-
gether with the nature of TPF investment, mean that TPF in investment arbitra-
tion could in fact be working as an exploitation of the investment law system, 
respondent states, and their citizens. In fact, as this Essay will argue, normative 
political theory strongly suggests that within the current BIT/ISDS system, 
TPF awards constitute unjustifiable wealth transfers from respondent host 
states (frequently, developing countries) and their citizens in favor of specula-
tive finance.10 For this reason, if not effectively regulated, TPF will further 
compromise not only the public’s faith in the investment system, but also the 
viability of the system for states and other stakeholders such as traditional for-
eign direct investors. 
Given these risks, states should consider banning TP, at least until the in-
ternational investment regime can be reformed towards more balanced agree-
ments. If TPF is to be allowed at all, it must, at a minimum, be strongly regu-
lated to limit some of its damaging effects. Current developments, however, 
are moving in the opposite direction, facilitating increased use of TPF and 
therefore intensifying the exploitation.11 If we are to move against TPF, and 
maintain the integrity of the investment treaty law system, the time to act is 
now. 
I. HOW TPF WORKS 
In order to understand how TPF can be characterized as an exploitation of 
the investment regime, it is first necessary to understand something of how TPF 
operates in an international setting, as a new element in the BIT/ISDS regime. 
A. The TPF Funding Model 
In the arbitration context, TPF is a specialized form of dispute financing 
in which a third-party finances the costs of arbitral proceedings for a party in a 
dispute that is subject to arbitration under a treaty-based ISDS provision.12 In 
return, the funder requires some degree of control over the case and receives a 
                                                                                                                           
so far as to characterize the international investment arbitration market for third-party funders as a 
“gambler’s paradise: heads I win, tails I do not lose.” Id. 
 10 See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 15–16 (noting the cost to Bulgaria of a TPF 
claim). 
 11 For example, Hong Kong and Singapore have recently passed legislation explicitly allowing 
TPF in ISDS. Melody Chan, Hong Kong, in THE THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING LAW REVIEW 
78, 78 (Leslie Perrin ed., 2017); Matthew Secomb & Adam Wallin, Singapore, in THE THIRD PARTY 
LITIGATION FUNDING LAW REVIEW 125, 126–29. Moreover, a 2018 industry self-study which largely 
whitewashes TPF in the BIT/ISDS system promises to only intensify this trend. See generally ICCA, 
REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4. 
 12 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. Outside of a treaty or private investment agree-
ment, there is no right to arbitrate against a state on the part of a private investor. 
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percentage of the awarded compensation if the claim is successful.13 If the 
claim fails, the funder receives no compensation and will bear the fees due to 
the claimant’s legal team as well as other adverse costs.14 The TPF industry is 
dominated by specialized litigation finance firms (such as Juridica in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Burford Capital in the United States, and Omni Bridgeway in the 
Netherlands), investment banks, and hedge funds, all of whom raise their TPF 
capital from private investors seeking speculative portfolio investment oppor-
tunities.15 Although the bulk of TPF funding goes towards domestic civil liti-
gation, funders have reported that over ten percent of their investments are 
made in both international investment arbitrations and international commer-
cial arbitrations.16 
Investment arbitration claims have proven especially attractive to third-
party funders because the amount of compensation resulting from such claims 
often far exceeds the compensation awarded in commercial arbitration, and 
investment treaty law offers virtually no counterclaim or offset possibilities for 
respondent states, thus making such claims very lucrative for funders.17 In-
deed, the size of the claim and costs associated with investment arbitrations 
can be enormous, often exceeding hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars, and the 
returns on such investments can be equally as staggering.18 These returns range 
from 30 to 50% on a portfolio basis, with outcomes in specific cases even 
higher.19 An example of this was recently reported by Burford Capital, which 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See id. at 5, 7 (summarizing the concept of TPF). Many funders exert control over the 
case/client by monitoring legal fees and requiring progress reports of the case, demanding the right to 
approve the claimant’s expenditures, having the choice of arbitrator, receiving updates of the case 
with any significant developments, and having direct access to the client’s attorneys. ICCA, REPORT 
OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 28. 
 14 Ronen Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2018); De Brabandere 
& Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. 
 15 Catherine A. Rogers, Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third-Party Funders, in ETHICS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 177, 178–79 (2014); see EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 57 tbl.3 (list-
ing well-known investment firms that engage in TPF of lawsuits). 
 16 Rogers, supra note 15, at 182 n.33. 
 17 See Rogers, supra note 15, at 178–79 (noting the significant opportunity present for funders in 
international arbitration); COLUM. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INV., THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITH ICCA/QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DRAFT REPORT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION 1 (2017) [hereinafter ROUND 
TABLE], http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/11/Third-Party-Funding-in-ISDS-Roundtable-Outcome-
Document-FINAL-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU5Y-SDP7] (noting that only claimants may file counter-
claims, not states). 
 18 Willem H. Van Boom, Third-Party Financing in International Investment Arbitration 
30 (Apr. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID
2043713_code342508.pdf?abstractid=2027114&mirid=1&type=2; see BURFORD CAPITAL, 2017 
ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2017), http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/BUR-28711-
Annual-Report-2017-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4R-9LBX] (noting, for example, the sale of a claim 
worth $325 million). 
 19 Van Boom, supra note 18, at 30. 
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in 2017 realized a 736% return on its investment following the sale of its inter-
est in an investment arbitration claim in Teinver v. Argentina.20 
TPF in an ISDS claim offers a significant upside to investor-claimants as 
well, because TPF minimizes the financial risk of bringing a claim against a 
host-state by shifting some or all of the cost-burdens to the funder.21 Third-party 
funders can—in theory—also provide support to the respondent states against 
whom the claims are brought. In reality, however, the overwhelming majority of 
funding goes to investor-claimants because states cannot recover financially 
through ISDS, thus offering no corresponding “upside potential” for TPF inves-
tors in funding states.22 
When deciding whether to enter into a funding agreement with a claimant, 
third-party funders conduct extensive due diligence and weigh several considera-
tions. One significant consideration is, of course, the merit of a claim.23 Invest-
ment arbitration offers a unique advantage to potential funders insofar as the ma-
jority of ISDS arbitral awards are published.24 This decreases uncertainty sur-
rounding their litigation investment and allows funders to more easily determine 
the likelihood that a case will prevail when evaluated against the background of 
trends in arbitral interpretations of key BIT provisions.25 
A second major consideration is the enforceability of the award against the 
host-state.26 Third-party funders are less likely to invest in cases they know will 
be unenforceable or difficult to enforce against the host-state.27 By way of ex-
ample, arbitrations brought under the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Conven-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. An appeal is currently pending in the 2017 case Teinver v. Argentina in the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, following an arbitration tribunal award in excess of 
$325 million. Id. at 23. Burford Capital invested approximately $13 million in the matter and sold 
their interest on the secondary market for $107 million for a gain of $94.2 million. Id. 
 21 EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that “a corporation can file a claim then pass 
the cash drain and the risk to a funder while waiting for a payout, making arbitration against states 
even more attractive for businesses”). 
 22 See id. at 7 (noting the greater financial upside for plaintiff side funding); see also Frank J. Garcia 
et al., The Case Against Third-Party Funding in ISDS: Executive Summary 6 (B.C. L. Sch. – PUC Univ. 
of Chile, Working Grp. on Trade & Inv. Law Reform, Third-Party Funding Task Force 2018), http://law
digitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2130&context=lsfp [https://perma.cc/BP8T-499U] 
(discussing the unbalanced TPF provided to plaintiffs compared to defendant-states in arbitration 
cases). In the few reported cases of third-party funders supporting respondent states, the funder often 
sought a share of funds recovered by the funded states in other disputes not related to the funded in-
vestment dispute or indeed the investment system generally. Interview with Lise Johnson, Head of 
Inv. Law and Policy, Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. (Apr. 23, 2018). 
 23 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5. 
 24 Id. at 6–7. 
 25 Id. These trends have in fact expanded the scope of key investment rules, making it even more 
likely for investment claims to succeed against states, hence making such claims even more attractive 
to TPF funders. 
 26 Id. at 5. 
 27 Id. at 10. 
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tion”) are particularly attractive to third party funders due to the ease of recog-
nizing and enforcing the award in the host-state under the ICSID Convention.28 
Finally, in deciding whether to finance a claimant, funders also weigh the 
value of the compensation sought, the extent of anticipated legal costs, and the 
expertise of the legal team that they will be funding.29 In particular, TPF fun-
ders have reported considering the level of development, expertise, and legal 
capacity of the target state, with preference given to claims against developing 
or newly industrialized states with both a capacity to pay the award and a re-
spectable investment rating they are eager to protect, while having only modest 
legal capacity and legal defense budgets.30 
B. TPF in the BIT/ISDS System 
TPF cannot be fully evaluated without reference to larger structural and 
institutional questions in investment law and to the fairness of the global eco-
nomic system as a whole. The current BIT/ISDS system is undergoing an his-
toric level of criticism and calls for reform, a larger process within which the 
current TPF critique forms a part.31 Even proponents of the current BIT/ISDS 
regime recognize the system’s flaws with respect to traditional rule of law de-
siderata such as transparency, predictability, coherence, and accountability.32 
Moreover, there is growing concern among scholars, civil society, and even 
some within the investment community that bilateral investment treaties and 
ISDS, in their current form, are no longer justifiable, even granting arguendo 
that they may have been when invented. Critics argue that the current BIT-
based international investment regime is fundamentally unbalanced in terms of 
norms and dispute resolution, offering investors a wide range of protections 
while offering states no meaningful basis for claims or counterclaims.33 In-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention imposes an obligation on all states party to the IC-
SID Convention to enforce the award “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State” with no 
review by national courts of that State. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 29 De Brabandere & Lepeltak, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 30 See ROUND TABLE, supra note 17, at 7–8 (discussing the criteria used by investors to decide 
whether to invest in claims). 
 31 See, e.g., Linarelli, supra note 7, at 147–48 (criticizing TPF as unjust); Roberts, supra note 7 
(discussing exploitative relationships that are created under international investment law); Sachs & 
Johnson, supra note 7 (discussing how international investment law helps rich countries at the ex-
pense of poor countries). 
 32 See, e.g., EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1 (detailing economic issues found in TPF); Rog-
ers, supra note 15 (calling for increased regulation of TPF); Van Boom, supra note 18 (calling for 
increased transparency in TPF). 
 33 See, e.g., EBERHARD & OLIVET, supra note 1; Rogers, supra note 15; Van Boom, supra note 
18. 
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deed, this imbalance has recently been referred to as “The Great Asymmetry” 
in international investment law today.34 
Even granting that there may have been valid historical reasons for this 
asymmetry in the post-colonial period, and that risks to the viability and secu-
rity of foreign investment continue to be real, in the view of this author the 
asymmetry nevertheless represents a fundamental flaw in the investment re-
gime.35 The BIT/ISDS regime today is deficient from the perspective of both 
governance and fairness, two parameters critical to shaping a more effective 
investment law regime for the 21st century. The regime presents a governance 
issue because the investment treaty regime can no longer simply be considered 
as treaties granting private parties legal rights.36 Global governance today ex-
pects that regulatory structures and decisions that affect a range of transnation-
al and national stakeholders (including investors) be made according to norms 
of participation, accountability, transparency, due process, and the rule of 
law.37 In these respects, the current international investment regime is lacking. 
Moreover, this asymmetry means the investment system is unfair in its 
distributive effects. Given that investment law is an allocative social institu-
tion,38 we must evaluate the investment regime according to the same fairness 
norms we would apply to any system of governance allocating economic rights 
and resources across a range of settings.39 The BIT/ISDS system fails to take 
into account its distributive effects on a range of stakeholders other than inves-
tors, the only stakeholder whose concerns are effectively recognized.40 Ensur-
ing a secure return on investment is fair, but this does not exhaust what fairness 
requires of investment law. 
Into this drama of doctrinal, procedural, governance, and fairness con-
cerns, TPF enters the scene. As will be argued below, TPF exacerbates the un-
fair effects of the BIT/ISDS system by exploiting the system’s weaknesses in 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See generally Alessandra Arcuri, The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in Trade and In-
vestment Agreements, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY (forthcoming 
2019) (discussing asymmetrical relationships which are created under many international investment 
treaties). 
 35 See, e.g., Garcia et al., supra note 7, 869–73 (discussing historical causes for, and contempo-
rary effects of, the asymmetrical nature of international investment regime). 
 36 See id. at 871; Roberts, supra note 7, at 65. 
 37 See EMMA AISBETT ET AL., RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE: PRIN-
CIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2018) (discussing how the international investment law system 
should take into account certain principles). 
 38 Garcia et al., supra note 7, at 876. 
 39 See Ratner, supra note 7, at 768; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 438–39 (1998) (discussing the role of fairness in international investment 
law). See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: 
THREE TAKES (2013) (discussing the standards of fairness that apply to international investment law). 
 40 Sachs & Johnson, supra note 7, at 15. See generally Garcia et al., supra note 7 (discussing the 
asymmetry found in investment treaties); Ratner, supra note 7 (discussing the unbalanced nature of 
the BIT/ISDS system). 
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ways that further undercut the regime’s capacity to satisfy even basic norms of 
distributive justice. 
II. THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION 
Despite the claims of its advocates and the possibility that impecunious in-
vestor-claimants could, in principle, be helped (counterarguments which will be 
addressed below), it is the view of this author that on the whole third-party fund-
ing in a legal system as unbalanced as the investment regime works as an exploi-
tation of the system’s flaws, to the detriment of stakeholders and for the benefit 
of speculative financiers. It does so by taking advantage of the system’s weak-
nesses to effect what amount to unjustified wealth transfers from the citizens and 
taxpayers of target states and into the hands of speculative finance, a class of 
beneficiary the BIT/ISDS system never intended. 
To recognize the risks posed by TPF, however, one need not adhere to a 
fundamental premise of this Essay, namely that the BIT/ISDS system today is 
fundamentally flawed. Even if one is of the view that the current BIT/ISDS 
system is appropriately designed for the protection of foreign direct invest-
ment, there are still important reasons for concern over TPF’s systemic effects. 
By opening the system to the resources (and priorities) of speculative invest-
ment, TPF risks intensifying the criticism and controversy surrounding an al-
ready-embattled system and overheating the system through an increase in the 
number of claims, thus undermining the benefits traditional investors have 
come to expect from the BIT/ISDS system, all for the benefit of speculative 
finance.41 
A. TPF Is an Exploitation of an Unbalanced System 
Under normative political theory, in order for TPF to qualify as an exploi-
tation, it must constitute an “unfair advantage-taking” of flaws in the structure 
and operation of the BIT/ISDS system to the detriment of other participants. 
After first explaining the nature of exploitation, I will then set out in what 
ways TPF takes advantage of the investment regime’s flaws, and how that ad-
vantage-taking is unfair. 
1. Economic Exploitation as Unfair Advantage-Taking 
Theorists offer a number of accounts of what renders an economic ar-
rangement exploitative.42 What the various accounts share in common is the 
notion of unfair advantage-taking.43 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See infra notes 43–72 and accompanying text. 
 42 See, e.g., Mathias Risse & Gabriel Wollner, Three Images of Trade: On the Place of Trade in a 
Theory of Global Justice, 1 MORAL PHIL. & POL. 201, 214 (2014) (defining exploitation); Matt 
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Unfair advantage-taking occurs when there is a flaw in the circumstances of 
the transaction, what Risse and Wollner call a “moral defect” in a distribution 
and its history.44 This flaw might be an injustice in background conditions, a 
vulnerability,45 a rights violation, or some other form of disabling disrespect.46 
Whatever its nature, the flaw operates in a specific socio-economic context be-
tween parties to result in one party accepting—seemingly inexplicably—a bar-
gain that is not fair, though with no evidence of direct coercion.47 We character-
ize the party benefitting from the flaw as exploiting the situation, and the vulner-
able party as the exploited party. 
2. Why TPF in ISDS Is an Exploitation of States Through the BIT Regime 
TPF is an exploitation because in the context of the current BIT/ISDS 
system it constitutes a case of unfair advantage-taking. TPF funders are inten-
tionally targeting the BIT/ISDS system as a speculative investment vehicle due 
to its unique structural characteristics.48 They are doing this in order to achieve 
wealth transfers—in the form of TPF-funded settlements or arbitral awards—
which represent unjustifiable transfers from target states and their citizens. 
a. TPF Takes Advantage of the BIT/ISDS Regime by Design 
That TPF is a case of intentional advantage-taking of the BIT/ISDS re-
gime can hardly be denied. By funders’ own account, TPF involvement in 
ISDS is predicated on precisely those aspects of the system that are most sub-
ject to criticism today. 
To begin with, there is the basic structure of the ISDS system. TPF fun-
ders fully recognize that under BITs, states have no substantive rights and 
therefore cannot assert counterclaims or offsets which would jeopardize or re-
duce any recovery. Moreover, ISDS gives claimants a direct voice in the selec-
tion of adjudicators and arbitration rules, allowing TPF funders a degree of 
influence over the tribunal that is unthinkable in domestic civil litigation. Fi-
                                                                                                                           
Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 154, 156–57 (2012) (explaining exploita-
tion in the context of economic arrangements). 
 43 Risse & Wollner, supra note 42, at 214; Zwolinski, supra note 42, at 156–57. See generally 
ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996) (explaining exploitation as a situation where one party 
takes advantage of another party). 
 44 Risse & Wollner, supra note 42, at 215. 
 45 Vulnerability is a useful term to describe a situation that makes one ripe for exploitation, 
whether an individual or a state. 
 46 See Robert E. Goodin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person, in MODERN THEORIES 
OF EXPLOITATION 166, 166–71 (Andrew Reeve ed., 1987) (explaining exploitation as a situation 
where one party takes advantage of another party). 
 47 See Zwolinski, supra note 42, at 158–61 (proposing that we consider exploitation in terms of 
fairness and injustice on a micro and macro level). 
 48 See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 1 at 58–59 (discussing different types of exploitation). 
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nally, the awards are unappealable and legally binding, and the global invest-
ment market makes ignoring an arbitral award a very risky course of conduct 
for any responding state concerned with its investment rating.49 
Jurisprudential trends in investment arbitration also make conditions bet-
ter for TPF and worse for states. Current expansive trends in arbitral interpreta-
tion of key BIT doctrines such as fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) favora-
bly alter the TPF risk calculus, making it more likely that states will face an 
increasing number of ISDS claims and an eroding legal basis for defending 
against those claims.50 The positive effects of these trends for TPF, and the 
negative effects for states, are magnified in a system that allows losing states 
no right of appeal, meaning that there is no coherent system for addressing ju-
risprudential outliers and moderating at an appellate level interpretive ap-
proaches taken at the tribunal level. 
The investment portfolio model of TPF that is fast becoming the norm al-
so means that claimants will be incentivized to take more chances with weaker 
and riskier claims, contrary to what TPF proponents claim. The costs of losing 
(spread over the portfolio) are low relative to the possible gains from either 
settling or in fact prevailing on a novel theory in that arbitration and, potential-
ly, an even more lucrative one in the future. 
Thus, in an already unbalanced system, funders confer additional ad-
vantages on investors (advancing at the same time their own interests) in a grow-
ing number of claims against responding states with limited substantive rights 
and no appellate rights. This is an additional challenge for states that are already 
burdened by competing sovereign budgetary responsibilities to many stakehold-
ers and that hold an attractive monopoly on the taxing power. 
b. TPF Advantage-Taking is Unfair 
But is this advantage-taking unfair? In the view of this author, it is, and 
resoundingly so. First, TPF represents a threat to fairness because it increases 
the resources available in a dispute to an already privileged class of investor-
claimants, to the detriment of other stakeholders who are not granted similar 
benefits and will bear the additional costs. TPF thus gives a small class of in-
vestors even more resources to prosecute an increasing number of claims 
against constrained states in (to the author’s eye) an already unbalanced sys-
tem. Moreover, it introduces a new class of beneficiaries, TPF funders, who 
were not originally intended as beneficiaries and yet who will profit from this 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. at 56–61. 
 50 See generally Sebastián López Escarcena, Investment Disputes Oltre lo Stato: On Global Ad-
ministrative Law, and Fair and Equitable Treatment, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2685 (2018) (discussing the 
doctrine of fair and equitable treatment). 
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system to the tune of somewhere between 30 and 50% of any settlement or 
award. 
Second, this advantage comes at a significant cost to target countries and 
their citizens. It has been estimated to cost states an average of $8 to $10 mil-
lion dollars to defend against a claim, even a spurious one.51 Moreover, states 
either lose or settle two-thirds of all investment disputes, adding settlement or 
judgement costs to these litigation costs.52 The scale of impact of these costs 
can be appreciated from a number of interacting factors: the upwardly-trending 
size of arbitral awards (recently averaging approximately $522 million per dis-
pute),53 the share of these awards that goes to TPF (estimated at 30 to50% alt-
hough precise data is hard to come by due to secrecy),54 and the increase in 
TPF-funded ISDS claims filed, part of the general increase in investment 
claims.55 
What is even worse from a fairness point of view is that these settlements 
and awards will ultimately be paid by a large class of stakeholders underrepre-
sented in the current system: the respondent state’s public, who as taxpayers 
and citizens are the “residual risk-bearers” in the current system. The public 
pays in the form of both fiscal and welfare burdens because losses and settle-
ments must (1) be paid out of the public fisc, with (2) money that is therefore 
no longer available for social welfare or other government spending priori-
ties.56 This is markedly different from the equities of domestic TPF litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 51 U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) 
on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 27 Nov.–1 Dec. 2017), Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (2017). 
 52 UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1, Feb. 2015, at 7, https://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5B6-X9FX] (noting 
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 53 UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, IIA IS-
SUES NOTE NO. 3, Nov. 2017, at 1, 5, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MWW-KYP3] (noting an average of $522 million awarded per successful claim-
ant). 
 54 Van Boom, supra note 18, at 30 (noting that investors generally receive between 30–50% of 
the arbitration award). 
 55 Although data on the extent of TPF in the BIT/ISDS system is hard to come by, in domestic 
litigation Australia, for example, saw an estimated 16.5% increase in claims filed after relaxing its 
TPF prohibitions. Moreover, a 2015 survey of investment lawyers by Queen Mary Law School found 
that 39% of respondents had encountered TPF in practice. See James Egerton Vernon, Taming the “Mer-
cantile Adventurers”: Third Party Funding and Investment Arbitration—A Report from the 14th Annual 
ITA-ASIL Conference, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.
com/2017/04/21/taming-the-mercantile-adventurers-third-party-funding-and-investment-arbitration-a-
report-from-the-14th-annual-ita-asil-conference/ [https://perma.cc/EHD7-FMVT] (citing to the 2015 
Queen Mary/White & Case International Arbitration Survey); Tara Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett, 
Essay, Third-Party Funding in Investment Arbitration: Misappropriation of Access to Justice Rhetoric 
by Global Speculative Finance, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. (forthcoming 2019), http://lawdigital
commons.bc.edu/ljawps/8/ (discussing flaws in the “access to justice” argument in favor of TPF). 
 56 Moreover, regulatory settlements (for example, waivers of environmental law requirements) 
can impose negative externalities on the public as well. 
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between commercial parties, where the costs of losing the case are borne by a 
commercial entity and its shareholders. 
c. TPF in ISDS Results in Unjustified Wealth Transfers 
For all these reasons, a settlement or arbitral award in a TPF-funded case 
can be understood as an unjustified wealth transfer. One can justify, at least in 
principle, an award or settlement paid to a traditional ISDS claimant on the 
basis of the larger “social contract of investment” between the investor, the 
host country and its stakeholders. In that contract, the original investor put its 
capital at risk and to work in the host country, offering development benefits in 
exchange for investment returns and a degree of legal protection. On the con-
trary, TPF funders are not parties to this social contract and TPF “investment” 
is purely speculative, at no time offering even the possibility of any develop-
ment benefits to the host country that might mitigate the equities of any subse-
quent arbitration-based transfers. 
This would be morally problematic even in cases where the respondent 
state is wealthy (should TPF funders decide to come after such states, which is 
unlikely), but it is particularly egregious (and sadly more frequent) when the 
transfers come from the citizens of developing and newly industrialized states, 
as they are likely to do, given that TPF funders have admitted taking develop-
ment status into account in their preliminary evaluation of a potential 
claim/investment.57 Such states are particularly vulnerable to TPF, given that 
the vast majority (88%) of all claimant investors are from high-income coun-
tries, and developing countries successfully defeat investment claims only 
about half as often as developed countries do.58 
For all these reasons, such transfers (in the form of TPF-funded awards) 
should be considered as prima facie unjustified—in fact, they appear to turn 
generally accepted norms of fairness upside down, amounting to an uncompen-
sated taking from the less-favored many for the benefit of the wealthy few, with 
no compensating social justification.59 Unless TPF advocates can justify such 
transfers, allowing speculative finance a stake in the outcome of ISDS claims, a 
voice in the determination of which cases to bring, which arbitrators to choose, 
and which cases to settle amounts to nothing less than a deliberate exploitation 
of the flaws in the BIT system for the benefit of speculators and at the cost of 
already-burdened respondent states, their taxpayers, and citizens. It is to those 
justificatory efforts that we now turn. 
                                                                                                                           
 57 ROUND TABLE, supra note 17. 
 58 Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or 
Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1154, 1266–
67 (2015). 
 59 Ironically, they also run counter to basic investment rules against expropriation, in that they 
serve no public purpose and offer no compensation to the burdened. 
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B. ISDS Wealth Transfers to TPF Funders Cannot Be Justified 
Attempts by TPF proponents to justify the role of TPF in ISDS offer three 
kinds of arguments in its defense. First, even conceding some TPF-related costs, 
TPF proponents argue that such costs are justifiable given the need to increase 
access to justice. Second, they argue that, given the fact that the claimant re-
mains in all cases the original productive investor, the claimant’s choice of fi-
nancing mechanisms is irrelevant to the underlying equities of the situation. Fi-
nally, TPF advocates could claim that the availability of litigation finance in in-
vestment arbitration could lead to an increase in productive investment, if poten-
tial investors know they need not face alone the high costs of vindicating their 
rights under the treaties in any future arbitrations. All three rationales, however, 
fail to adequately justify this practice. 
1. TPF Is Not About Access to Justice 
Proponents of TPF in ISDS have drawn justification from traditional TPF 
rationales, arguing that funding of investment claims provides access to justice 
for investors who wish to seek redress but lack sufficient financial resources. 
This is a view favored by funders, as it frames their role as a vital one, which 
facilitates and contributes to global economic justice.60 In the ISDS context, 
however, this rationale is fundamentally flawed—the role of TPF in the ISDS 
system cannot be equated with providing financing for disadvantaged claim-
ants.61 
Traditionally access to justice has meant capacity-building for social jus-
tice, or, in other words, providing financing or other support for parties who 
lack the human and financial resources to litigate. In contrast, as TPF funders 
readily and publicly acknowledge, TPF in ISDS is primarily about balance-
sheet management, offering well-resourced claimants the ability to minimize 
the risk associated with bringing a claim, and does not focus on providing 
funding to impecunious or disadvantaged claimants.62 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Kelsie Massini, Risk Versus Reward: The Increasing Use of Third Party Funders in Inter-
national Arbitration and the Awarding of Security for Costs, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 323, 325 
(2015) (discussing reforms to TPF in international investment law). 
 61 See Santosuosso & Scarlett, supra note 55 (arguing that “it seems morally objectionable to 
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In fact, when one considers access to justice in its broadest social context, 
TPF actually risks impairing access to justice for developing respondent states 
and their citizens. TPF funding exacerbates the inherent imbalance in the BIT 
system, disproportionately affecting already disadvantaged states’ ability to con-
trol regulatory change within their borders and deliver important social welfare 
benefits. TPF further shifts power and resources towards private investors, which 
can in turn negatively impact the political affairs and social welfare of develop-
ing nations by sapping their resources.63 
2. TPF Does in Fact Alter the Equities of Investment Arbitration 
It could be argued that, at least formally speaking, the presence of TPF in 
ISDS arbitration does not change the identity of the claimant, nor the fact that 
in principle the entire award goes to the claimant. In that sense, how the claim-
ant has decided to fund its claim and allocate the award (or settlement) should 
not affect the underlying equities of ISDS arbitration. Investors file claims, 
arbitrators adjudicate them, and, if the claim is successful, states pay them—
business as usual. 
TPF does not mean business as usual, however, but quite the opposite. 
The role of TPF funders in case management decisions means that the goals 
and interests of speculative finance—maximizing return on investment in a 
context (a system to facilitate long-term productive investment) in which TPF 
funders as speculators are not repeat players—may take the place of the goals 
and interests of a traditional claimant who must balance settlement value 
against the risks, costs (to their own funds), and possible returns of litigation in 
the context of a possibly ongoing business relationship.64 This is precisely the 
risk that common law notions of maintenance and champerty were intended to 
prevent. 
To this must be added the systemic effects of TPF investment, with avail-
able (though limited) evidence suggesting that TPF is both increasing the 
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number of claims filed and increasing the likelihood that weaker claims will be 
pursued.65 Both trends increase the burden on already-burdened states to de-
fend against or settle such claims, while undercutting the justification for this. 
Finally, there are the differences in the political economy of ISDS arbitra-
tion when compared with the civil litigation and commercial arbitration envi-
ronments TPF originally came from. The underlying asymmetry of BITs—the 
fact that under BIT rules, only states face the risk of large damage payments 
versus private litigants in any TPF-funded commercial litigation or arbitra-
tion—means that TPF changes the game unilaterally for states in a way it does 
not for commercial parties. 
Finally, the fact that in ISDS arbitration the residual risk bearers for the los-
ing states are citizens and taxpayers, not the shareholders of private enterprise, 
means that the investor’s decision about funding does affect the equities in that it 
affects the source of TPF returns on investment. We should be concerned when 
states and their citizens, not other shareholders, bear the brunt of TPF wealth-
maximization. 
3. There Is No Evidence That the Availability of TPF Promotes Foreign 
Direct Investment 
If the availability of TPF funding could be shown to promote an increase 
in foreign direct investment (“FDI”) flows because it reduced a potential inves-
tor’s future legal costs, this could offer justification for the public and systemic 
costs of TPF. There is no evidence, however, suggesting that the availability of 
TPF would in fact increase the amount of FDI, the only compensating factor 
that could potentially be of benefit to states and their citizens. 
Given the secrecy surrounding TPF in ISDS, it is difficult to determine 
with precision the extent to which TPF is involved in ISDS, making it impos-
sible to determine if any increases in FDI would be TPF-related. Available evi-
dence suggests that it is unlikely that TPF would have such an investment-
promoting effect. To begin with, the economic data on the role of BITs in in-
creasing FDI is inconclusive.66 It seems likely that if BITs have no clear effect 
on FDI, then the availability of litigation funding would have even less effect. 
Moreover, there is a recent study suggesting that even pro-investor reforms to 
the provisions of investment agreements similarly have no clear incentivizing 
effect on FDI.67 
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Instead, what seems clear (but again, on survey and anecdotal evidence 
only), is that the number of disputes against states is increasing, which by itself 
offers no benefit whatsoever to states or their citizens.68 Insofar as the availa-
bility of TPF is a factor promoting this increase, the social justification for TPF 
in ISDS only gets weaker. 
C. Even the Regime’s Defenders Should Fear TPF 
It is a fundamental premise of this argument that the current BIT/ISDS sys-
tem is flawed and that TPF funders take advantage of these flaws to the detri-
ment of traditional stakeholders. Proponents of the ISDS system as currently 
constituted should also recognize, however, that opening the ISDS system to 
TPF is unwise for anyone relying on the system’s long-term survival. 
Whether or not one considers the many critiques of the BIT/ISDS system 
to be valid, it is clear that together they create a legitimacy crisis for the re-
gime. Not only are many states, stakeholders, academics, and civil society or-
ganizations highly critical of the regime, but there have also been recent high-
profile exits from the regime, and significant changes in policy on the part of a 
number of states that span the development spectrum.69 
In this environment, the growing role of TPF in ISDS risks further over-
heating ISDS to the point of collapse, giving resentful states additional rea-
sons—and excellent public relations talking points—for exiting the regime. 
This may not be in the long-term interest of traditional FDI investors, insofar 
as they are counting on the long-term viability of ISDS for the protection of 
their traditional—and legitimate—investment interests.70 For similar reasons, 
business and commercial interests in the United States of America have, 
through the Chamber of Commerce, resisted the rise of domestic TPF-funded 
litigation as inimical to the long-term health of the civil litigation and arbitra-
tion systems its business membership depends on.71 
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TPF thus creates risks that threaten the long-term viability of ISDS and 
the current international investment regime. Allowing TPF to skew the 
BIT/ISDS system into a facilitation mechanism for controversial wealth trans-
fers for the benefit of speculators hurts everyone else, including traditional 
stakeholders such as FDI investors. 
III. ADDRESSING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS EXPLOITATION  
THROUGH LAW REFORM 
As an exploitative mechanism for unjustified wealth transfers, TPF 
should be barred from all ISDS cases until the system is fundamentally re-
formed both substantively and procedurally. At present, however, the TPF in-
dustry is in the midst of an aggressive worldwide lobbying campaign to in-
crease the number of jurisdictions permitting TPF.72 Moreover, the industry 
has undertaken an attempt at self-regulation and produced a report (“Report”), 
sponsored by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration and the 
Queen Mary Law School, which not only fails to recognize adequately the det-
rimental role of TPF in ISDS, but also seeks to normalize it TPF in ISDS and 
facilitate its increased use.73 Together these efforts create serious risks for all 
stakeholders, and contradict sound public policy. 
A. Regulation Is Not Enough 
Although the Report offers useful recommendations for addressing im-
portant ethical and professional issues raised by TPF across a range of dispute 
platforms, it almost entirely sidesteps the risk of exploitation of TPF in the 
ISDS system.74 For this reason, the Report risks doing more harm than good in 
the area of investment because it normalizes an exploitative practice under the 
guise of regulating it.75 
The Report adopts a disclosure-based regime with conflict of interest 
rules.76 This is not an unprincipled view in itself and represents an improvement 
over the status quo. However, given the stakes involved, the exploitative nature 
of TPF in ISDS, and the costs to respondent countries’ taxpayers and citizens, it 
is not enough of a regulatory response. Certainly, it is a step in the right direction 
to know who is exploiting the Great Asymmetry, by how much, and for whose 
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benefit, but in light of the fundamental inequities described above it is inade-
quate. By failing to conclusively acknowledge the underlying structural risks of 
TPF in ISDS, the Report amounts to a call for regulated exploitation, whatever 
the bona fides of its authors.77 
Moreover, at a rhetorical and strategic level, the approach of the Report it-
self implies that the presence of TPF in ISDS is beyond regulation or review, 
that there will be no further public consideration or regulatory response except to 
moderate some of its effects.78 One can see in the careful wording of Chapter 
Eight, for example, that the Task Force had to contend with strong differences of 
opinion on this question.79 Nevertheless, there is reason for concern that, by its 
omissions and elisions, the ISDS portions of the Report will be read more as a 
ratification of the status quo with respect to TPF than as the opening contribution 
to a searching and public-minded regulatory conversation on TPF and invest-
ment arbitration that the Report ostensibly seeks to be. 
Thus for the reasons set forth above, and the Report’s recommendations 
notwithstanding, TPF should be barred from all ISDS cases until the system is 
fundamentally reformed both substantively and procedurally. Simple disclosure 
is not an adequate remedy when the structural defects of the system are so basic 
and so prone to exploitation. Allowing TPF to operate within ISDS—even under 
an enhanced disclosure regime—reduces an institution designed to protect and 
incentivize allocations of development capital, address injustice (albeit imper-
fectly), and maintain order, into a speculative investment opportunity. This is the 
kind of economic distortion of dispute resolution that traditional prohibitions on 
maintenance and champerty were designed to prevent. 
This pattern—de-regulating traditional safeguards in order to facilitate 
speculative finance’s exploitation of a substantive regime for extraordinary 
short-term gain—bears an uncomfortable similarity to the regulatory decisions 
taken in the United States, such as the elimination of the Glass-Steagall Act, that 
gave speculation an increased role in home mortgage finance, creating tremen-
dous wealth for a few but also unleashing the greatest global economic recession 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See generally id. 
 78 See id. at 255–56. 
 79 Id. at 199–226. These differing opinions can be seen in an introductory explanation to chapter 8: 
One of the primary challenges was linguistic. The language used by different stake-
holders in debates about investment arbitration can be particularly stark. Terminology 
that is part of the basic lexicon of one group of stakeholders is often regarded by those 
with competing views as inherently biased or unduly inflammatory. Despite these chal-
lenges, this Chapter aims to provide a full-throated presentation of competing view-
points in a manner that both respects particular stakeholders’ frame of reference, but al-
so facilitates meaningful discussion. 
Id. at 199–200. 
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since the 1920s.80 Granted, the systemic risks from TPF in ISDS may not be as 
great as the systemic risks created by mortgage-backed securities and their rela-
tionship to financial derivatives, but for citizens of targeted countries the threats 
to wealth, savings, public goods, and public welfare are equally great, as are the 
uncompensated wealth transfers which TPF effects from the needy many to a 
privileged few. 
Prudent voices have expressed the view that until there is a richer empiri-
cal data set on the scale, role, and effect of TPF in ISDS, it would be premature 
to ban or heavily regulate TPF.81 Although this Essay recognizes the im-
portance of data-driven regulation, it must also be recognized that the scale of 
current investment, even imperfectly estimated, and the increasing rate of TPF 
funding, suggest strong momentum and powerful financial interests behind 
increased TPF activity in ISDS.82 Simply put, by the time we understand more 
empirically the full nature of the risks and effects, it may be too late to stop 
TPF. Certainly, many citizens of developing and other target countries will 
have seen public resources intended for their welfare diverted into portfolio 
returns to speculative financiers, at rates as high as seven-hundred percent-plus 
ROI.83 
Under such conditions, it would seem that the precautionary principle, an 
established guideline of international law designed for such situations, would 
support quick action in the face of large-scale and potentially irreversible harm 
to human well-being.84 Essentially, the precautionary principle reminds regula-
                                                                                                                           
 80 KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 16 (2011) (discussing 
deregulation of the financial industry and its effect on the housing industry). 
 81 See Rachel Denae Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure: Regulating Third-Party Funding for Future 
Analysis and Reform¸ 59 B.C. L. REV. 2935 (2018) [hereinafter Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure]. 
 82 It is difficult to determine with any precision the exact extent of TPF activity in investment 
arbitration, principally because TPF funders and funded litigants have been loath to disclose the pres-
ence of TPF and on what terms. There is, however, general consensus even within the arbitral com-
munity that the TPF presence is significant and increasing. See William Park & Catherine A. Rogers, 
Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: The ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force, in AUSTRIAN 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 115 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds., 2015) (ac-
cording to an estimate from a major funder on the Queen Mary Task Force, “at least two-thirds of 
ICSID cases filed in 2013 implicated claimants which had sought resources from a major funder”); 
see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper 
for the Investment Policy Community 37 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2012/03, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207366 (“Commercial third party funders gen-
erally prefer not to disclose their role to the other parties or to the adjudicators, and funders and parties 
appear to consider that no clear disclosure requirements currently exist. Accordingly, it is not possible 
to determine the scope of third party funding in ISDS. However, available evidence suggests an al-
ready significant role.”). 
 83 See 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 23 (noting sale of a stake in an arbitration claim 
for 736% ROI). 
 84 See Sonia E. Rolland, Note, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an International 
Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 430 (2002) (explaining the precautionary principle and its appli-
cation in international law). 
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tors that there is a social responsibility to protect the public from exposure to 
harm when a serious substantive investigation has found a plausible risk, and 
justifies them in exercising discretion to prevent such harms even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty.85 
The well-documented asymmetries in investment treaty law, coupled with 
the clearly “fit-to-purpose” funding model employed by TPF funders, amount 
in this case to the responsible identification of a plausible risk, and would in 
the view of this author justify regulation in the face of a relatively less-
developed empirical record. That this record is in fact lacking due to the delib-
erate secrecy policies of TPF funders themselves only reinforces the urgency 
and appropriateness of this response. In fact, given that funders have the in-
formation to reduce such uncertainty but have chosen for self-interested rea-
sons not to disclose it, the presumption should be that the information, if dis-
closed, would raise—not alleviate—concerns about TPF in ISDS. It would be 
a further injustice to allow TPF’s cloaking behavior to become the pretext for 
further delaying regulatory action. 
B. How TPF Could Be Banned 
Banning TPF as a finance mechanism for ISDS would require concerted 
action in a number of venues and jurisdictions. To begin with, states which 
currently prohibit TPF in their domestic legal systems should maintain this 
ban, at least as far as banning the recognition and enforcement in their jurisdic-
tions of TPF-funded investment arbitral awards.86 For example, as recently as 
May 2017, the Supreme Court of Ireland, in Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v. 
Minister for Public Enterprise, confirmed that third party funding is prohibited 
by law due to the violation of the torts of maintenance and champerty by 
TPF.87 States should also make it clear in any subsequent or amended BITs that 
TPF is prohibited from disputes arising under the BIT in question. States ban-
ning TPF from their jurisdictions would also be in a position to object to the 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See id. The precautionary principal is defined by the United Nations in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irre-
versible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 86 It would thus be possible for a state to allow TPF in domestic litigation and arbitration while 
banning it in ISDS-related actions. 
 87 Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v. Minister for Public Enterprise [2016] IEHC 187, ¶ 81, 87 
(Ir.). The Court found that it “is clear that the provision of assistance with a view to supporting litiga-
tion in return for a share of the proceeds in the absence of a bona fide interest is contrary to public 
policy and constitutes an abuse of process.” Id. ¶ 81. 
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presence of such funding in any investment arbitrations for which they are the 
situs. 
States should also seek collective action opportunities to ban TPF. Such 
collective action could include the negotiation of TPF bans in the investment 
chapters of any regional trade agreements they are party to, as well exercising 
their role in arbitral associations such as ICSID and the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to support a TPF ban in the arbi-
tral rules of these key associations.88 By acting in concert, states could minimize 
any real or perceived risks of alienating foreign investment or investment arbi-
tration business through unilateral bans.89 
Even though the prospects for a multilateral investment treaty (an ideal 
place in which to ban TPF) are not strong, there are important regional trade 
and investment projects currently underway which could also offer important 
regulatory opportunities in this regard. For example, as the European Union’s 
leadership on the investment-court model demonstrates, a strong and reform-
oriented jurisdiction that stands at the hub of a number of investment treaties 
can exercise leadership towards creating new paradigms through its own treaty 
practice.90 Moreover, as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) tax avoidance project illustrates, innovative multilateral 
strategies for coherently amending a multitude of bilateral treaties do exist, 
which is what the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“MLI”) accomplishes in 
the area of bilateral tax treaties, base erosion and profit-shifting.91 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Efforts are already underway to include TPF in the agenda of the current UNCITRAL and ICSID 
rules reform efforts, in which this author and others have participated. See generally ICSID SECRETARI-
AT, PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ICSID RULES—SYNOPSIS (2018), https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_One.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX5N-KBPK] (outlining proposals for 
amendments to ICSID’s rules); Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of 
Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410, 416–19 (2018); Anthea Roberts & Zeineb Bouraoui, 
UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Costs, Transparency, Third Party Funding and Coun-
terclaims, EJIL: TALK! (June 6, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-
about-costs-transparency-third-party-funding-and-counterclaims/ [https://perma.cc/R3PE-BNDV] (sum-
marizing different states’ concerns regarding ISDS). 
 89 The Mauritius Convention may also be one such avenue by which states could unilaterally ban 
confidential TPF. G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based 
Investor-State Arbitration, (Dec. 10, 2014) (establishing rules geared towards increased transparency 
in TPF arbitration). Moreover, clarifying that a state law ban affects only investment TPF and not 
commercial arbitration should allay any fears of alienating commercial arbitration business, an im-
portant industry for many jurisdictions. 
 90 The EU is developing a proposal for a multi-lateral investment court and has inserted language 
in its recent investment and trade agreements permitting the grafting-in of such an option if it is 
adopted. See The Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUR. COMM’N, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 [https://perma.cc/3L7W-CN6V] (outlining the proposal for a multi-
lateral investment court). 
 91 See generally OECD, MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED 
MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING: INFORMATION BROCHURE (2018), 
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More work needs to be done to develop an effective multi-prong legal 
strategy towards banning TPF in ISDS. Although the legal and practical chal-
lenges are real, the goal is a worthy one: in law, one does not aim to regulate 
exploitation—one aims to stop it. 
C. Stronger Regulation Is Needed if TPF Is to Be Allowed 
If TPF is to be allowed in ISDS in some form, then ISDS arbitral rules 
should require mandatory, expansive disclosure of third-party funding agree-
ments, coupled with mandatory security for costs.92 Although there is growing 
consensus that the existence and identity of a TPF funder should be disclosed, 
such disclosure should go farther and include the terms of funding agree-
ments.93 This aligns well with general institutional trends toward increased 
transparency and highlights funding agreement provisions that create perverse 
incentives. Such expansive disclosure will also provide the much-needed data 
for future research into the benefits and harms involved in TPF and enable 
more effective regulation going forward. 
Although there is currently no systemic requirement to disclose the pres-
ence or identity of third-party funders, some promising steps have been taken. 
The Report, although flawed, does call for limited disclosure.94 On the regulato-
ry front, Article 8.26, of the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement includes 
mandatory disclosure of the presence and identity of TPF funders, and Article 
23(1) of the Singapore Investment Arbitration Commission Rules provide the 
tribunal the discretionary authority to order disclosure of the details of the 
agreement as well.95 The strengths of both of these approaches should be com-
                                                                                                                           
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-BEPS-tax-treaty-information-brochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7YNS-J6CW]. The MLI is an innovative multilateral legal instrument to amend 
bilateral income tax treaties in order to implement Base Erosion and Profit Sharing standards through 
a single-instrument unifying framework that offers flexibility to signing countries to: (i) identify the 
treaties they are willing to amend and (ii) identify optional amendments they agree to adopt in those 
treaties they propose to amend, in addition to the minimum standards required by the treaty. Id. Over 
80 countries have agreed to amend income tax treaties under this instrument (subject to individual 
country ratification procedures), which entered into force on July 1, 2018. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLE-
MENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING (2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK79-UVKU]. 
 92 See Rachel Denae Thrasher, The Regulation of Third Party Funding: Gathering Data for Future 
Analysis and Reform 5–6 (B.C. L. Sch. L. & Just. in the Americas Working Paper No. 9, 2018), http://law
digitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/9/ [https://perma.cc/4RVC-3NKV] (calling for reforms to TPF to provide 
for more disclosure). 
 93 See generally Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure, supra note 81. 
 94 ICCA, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 81 (calling for 
limited disclosure of third-party funding). 
 95 See Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.26, Oct. 30, 2016, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H53-E2SL] (provid-
ing “[w]here there is third party funding, the disputing party benefiting from it shall disclose to the other 
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bined into a single requirement for both mandatory and comprehensive disclo-
sure of the presence of TPF and its terms.96 
As an adjunctive strategy to mandatory expansive disclosure, tribunals 
hearing claims involving TPF funding should be empowered to impose manda-
tory security for costs as a matter of course.97 Security for costs orders require 
the claimant to pay the state’s legal costs in the event the claim is denied and 
can provide a disincentive to funders from pursuing weak cases merely for 
their settlement or future precedential value. 
CONCLUSION 
It is critically important that states, their negotiators, academics and civil 
society take a careful, transparent, and sustained look at the risks that TPF pos-
es to the public and to the investment regime itself. Rather than be positioned 
as a fait accompli, TPF should be properly understood as posing exploitation 
and other risks to the current investment regime, and should be eliminated out-
right while the possibility still exists. If, however, TPF is to be allowed, for 
example in order to permit data collection towards future regulation, it should 
be restricted by the constraints outlined above and others yet to be formulated. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the benefits of regulating to-
wards disclosure and further data collection come at the cost of accepting in 
the meantime a rapidly growing TPF presence in ISDS and foregoing the broad 
systemic benefits of a TPF ban. This could make it difficult if not impossible to 
effectively regulate TPF down the road. The risk we undertake is to look back 
at this moment as we do to the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, as a story of 
opportunities missed at the cost of suffering unleashed. 
                                                                                                                           
disputing party and to the Tribunal the name and address of the third party funder”); SIAC, INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION RULES OF THE SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE 12 art. 23(1) (1st ed. 
2017), http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA/SIAC%20Investment%20Arbitration%20
Rules%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG7M-DS2S] (providing that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by 
the Parties, the Tribunal may . . . require a Party to give any expert appointed under Rule 23.1(a) any 
relevant information, or to produce or provide access to any relevant documents, goods or property for 
inspection”). 
 96 Thrasher, supra note 92, at 7–8. 
 97 An example of this would be the arguments in favor of this approach made by Gavan Griffith, 
arbitrator in the RSM case. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
